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This  paper  proposes  a  simplified  model  of  intrahousehold  decision  making  where  cooperative  and  non-
cooperative  behavior  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  Individuals  choose  the  optimal  share  of  income  they
wish to devote  towards  cooperation,  where  income  is pooled  and  allocated  collectively,  and  towards
noncooperation,  where  income  is allocated  independently.  Using  the example  of joint  saving  as  an  area
of household  cooperation,  this  model  shows  how  limited  autonomy  and  bargaining  power  can  interact
to create  incentives  for  individuals  to  hide  income.  This  result  provides  theoretical  support  for  the  call to
collect  survey  data  separately  from  individuals  rather  than  from  household  representatives.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
It seems obvious that anybody could keep a ‘secret stash’ of
money behind their spouse’s back if they wanted to. Even the
earliest typologies of money management arrangements in male
breadwinner households implicitly allowed for some hiding of
income (Pahl, 1983, 1989, 1995). Nevertheless, this aspect of intra-
household decision making has been overlooked by social scientists
because, first, the hiding of income was expected to be small and
therefore immaterial, and second, it does not immediately appear
to have other important consequences. There is growing evidence,
however, that not only is the amount of hidden income substan-
tial in both developed and developing countries, but also that it
has broader implications on the way economists conduct house-
hold surveys and on the rigor of the empirical analyses that use
them. Taking this issue seriously raises a number of questions:
Under what conditions do these decisions take place and what
incentives do spouses face? What role does bargaining power play?
Is there reason to believe that women are more likely than men
to hide income, as popular media suggests (Whitaker, 2004)? Are
there fundamental differences between, for example, the decision
of a Kenyan woman to join a ‘secret saving club’ (Anderson and
Baland, 2002), the decision of a Japanese woman to keep her hes-
okuri or belly button money (Whitaker, 2004), and the decision of
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an American woman to open a private bank account (Whitaker,
2004; Allianz, 2006)?
To explore why  spouses hide income, this paper proposes a
simplified model of intrahousehold decision making where cooper-
ative and noncooperative behavior are not mutually exclusive. This
model differs from other noncooperative bargaining models in that
each person’s decision to cooperate is characterized as a continuous
decision variable. This approach allows individuals to choose the
optimal share of income they wish to devote towards cooperation,
where income is pooled and allocated collectively, and towards
noncooperation, where income is allocated independently. Since
individuals can choose to contribute less than their full income,
the realized gains from cooperation can also vary according to the
contributions of each partner. Using the example of joint saving as
an area of household cooperation, this model shows how limited
autonomy and bargaining power can interact to create incentives
for individuals to hide income.
In contrast, intrahousehold allocation models describe the
behavior of married couples as either cooperative or noncooper-
ative. Cooperation implies that couples pool all their resources and
then jointly decide how these resources are allocated, be it through
consensus, Nash bargaining (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy
and Horney, 1981), or some other form of collective decision mak-
ing (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, 1997). If cooperation breaks down
and divorce is not feasible,1 individuals retreat to their fallback
1 Lundberg and Pollak (1993) argue that the noncooperative solution can arise
if  binding contracts are not enforceable or if transactions and/or monitoring costs
overwhelm potential gains from cooperation.
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positions given by the noncooperative solution within marriage
(for example, see Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Carter and Katz,
1997; Chen and Wooley, 2001). Noncooperation implies that indi-
viduals allocate their own resources according to their personal
preferences. Any contributions to household public goods in the
absence of cooperation are therefore voluntary, and may  be guided
by socially accepted gender roles (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993).
This depiction of household decision making has important
implications for the collection of financial information in household
surveys. Cooperation implies that information is publicly shared
within households, while the withholding of information implies
noncooperation.2 The conventional belief that families are inher-
ently cooperative, or at the very least share information completely
even when they do not cooperate, is the rationale for the collection
of financial information at the household level.3
There is growing evidence, however, that the extent of pri-
vately held information missed by conventional household surveys
may  be substantial. A number of specialized surveys that collect
income and other financial information from spouses in separate
interviews show that some financial transactions undertaken by
individuals were unknown to their partners. For example, data
collected by Markus Goldstein and Christopher Udry in Ghana
reveal significant differences in what couples know about each
other’s income and expenditures (Goldstein, 1999). Similarly,
Ashraf (2009) finds that 34 percent of husbands in her sample make
more money without their wife’s knowledge, while 29 percent of
wives make more money without their husbands’ knowledge. In
addition, her randomized field experiment provides evidence that
Filipino men  prefer to hide extra income when they know that their
wives will not find out (Ashraf, 2009). These findings are not unique
to developing countries, however. A 2006 Allianz survey of 3183
adults in the United States reveal that 18 percent of women and
9 percent of men  keep a ‘secret stash’ of cash unknown to their
spouse (Allianz, 2006).
The prevalence of privately held financial information may
suggest that the behavior of married couples is better described
by individual-level or noncooperative models. In many cases,
however, the hiding of financial information is accompanied by
seemingly cooperative behavior. Ashraf (2009) observes that some
individuals choose to conceal a portion of their income even while
reporting joint control over financial decisions. A similar pattern
emerges among Thai and Filipino couples in the 2002 Urban Poor
Home Worker Survey (UPHWS), where some individuals report
both joint and personal saving accounts.4 These studies suggest
that cooperative and noncooperative behavior are not necessar-
ily mutually exclusive. Partial or semi-cooperation can be done
overtly, where the withheld portion of individual incomes are pub-
licly known within the household, or covertly, where individuals
report or disclose only the portion of income or assets that they
wish to contribute to the household pool and then conceal the
rest.5 Such semi-cooperative behavior can be justified using exist-
ing household models by assuming that some household decisions
are cooperative, while some are noncooperative (Agarwal, 1997;
2 Note that under noncooperation, information may  or may  not be publicly shared
within the household. Thus, public information is consistent with both cooperation
and noncooperation, while private information strictly implies noncooperation.
3 In a unitary model, one spouse can act as a dictator (benevolent or otherwise),
controling all resources and making all the decisions. Thus, complete information
can  be obtained so long as the benevolent dictator or household head is chosen as
the survey respondent.
4 The 2002 UPHWS is a multi-country dataset collected by American University
and Cornell University researchers in Bolivia, Ecuador, Thailand and the Philippines.
Its  credit, savings and decision making modules were collected from husbands and
wives privately in separate interviews.
5 An alternative strategy is to report “ghost” expenses or salary deductions,
referred to in the Tagalog vernacular as kupit (literally, “to pilfer”) (Ashraf, 2009).
Katz, 1997). Nevertheless, existing models are unclear on how both
cooperative and noncooperative behavior can arise simultaneously
within the same types of decisions, e.g., saving, as the evidence
suggests.
The possibility that households behave semi-cooperatively rein-
forces the issues raised by noncooperative household models on
traditional survey methodology. Estimation of demand functions
that use household income as a regressor can yield biased esti-
mates if surveys measure household income incorrectly by relying
on a single household informant. This measurement error is easily
corrected if such errors arise randomly. But if the degree to which
individuals keep financial information private varies systemati-
cally, say with bargaining power or other characteristics, then this
measurement error may  be endogenous. This endogeneity intro-
duces an additional source of bias for empirical analyses that use
household income as a regressor (Ashraf, 2009). The model pro-
posed in this paper demonstrates how cooperating couples can,
at the same time, behave noncooperatively, thus providing fur-
ther theoretical support for the call to collect financial information
individually and separately for couples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a brief survey of related literature on intrahousehold allocation,
followed by a description of the general model setup, its application
to savings, and a discussion of the implications of limited autonomy
in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. Brief review of related models
Economists have traditionally described household behavior
as unitary. As its name suggests, the unitary model treats the
household as if it were a single utility-maximizing agent. In the
unitary model, a benevolent dictator or representative agent allo-
cates pooled household income to maximize household welfare.
A household may  act as one if all of its members has identical or
common preferences (Samuelson, 1956), if one member acts like a
dictator out of benevolence (Becker, 1981), or if one member acts
like a dictator out of their ability to use violence on other members
(Alderman et al., 1995).
An important shortcoming of the unitary model is that it is not
clear how conflicting preferences within households are resolved.
Instead, unitary models portray the household as a harmonious
whole, which, ideal as it may  be, runs counter to common expe-
rience. Becker (1981) addressed this concern through his famous
“Rotten Kid Theorem,” which demonstrated how dissenting wives
defer to their altruistic husbands out of self-interest. This defense of
the unitary model was not entirely convincing to many researchers
who sought alternative models of household decision making. This
led to a new class of collective or joint decision making models that
recognize the distinct preferences of individual members but dif-
fer primarily in the mechanisms by which families are assumed to
resolve their differences.
Two  types of collective models have since dominated the liter-
ature: Nash cooperative bargaining models, and the sharing-rule
approach or Chiappori-type collective models. Manser and Brown
(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) pioneered the application
of a Nash cooperative bargaining framework in the household con-
text. In a Nash cooperative bargaining model, the married couple
solves a joint allocation problem to maximize the product of indi-
vidual gains to cooperation subject to a joint full-income constraint
(McElroy, 1997). The division of the utility gains from cooperation
therefore varies systematically with members’ threat point or fall-
back position, the level of utility individuals can expect outside
the marriage. An important contribution of this line of modeling
is that the concept of relative power within the household is made
explicit through the fallback positions or outside options, which
ultimately determine intrahousehold allocation. McElroy (1990,
Author's personal copy
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1997) describes these fallback positions as a function of demo-
graphic, legal, macroeconomic and other institutional conditions
external to the household.
A more general type of collective household model is the
sharing-rule approach introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992, 1997).
In a Chiappori-type collective model, there are no restrictions on
how joint decision making takes place, except that the resulting
allocations be efficient. Thus, the household behaves as if it were
maximizing the weighted sum of individual members’ preferences,
where the weights or shares reflect the relative bargaining power
of individuals (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). The result is that
the allocations more closely reflect the preferences of the more
powerful household members, consistent with the predictions of
the Nash cooperative bargaining models. This model also exhibits
the useful property of nesting the unitary model. The household
welfare function collapses to a single set of preferences when pref-
erences are common, i.e., the weights do not matter, or when the
sharing rule is weighted entirely towards one person’s (the dicta-
tor’s) preferences, i.e., other members’ preferences do not matter.
This feature facilitated empirical tests of the unitary model, and has
led to the accumulation of empirical evidence against it (Alderman
et al., 1995).
These non-unitary models have thus refined the picture of the
family from a perfectly harmonious unit acting as one, to a diverse
collection of individuals whose differences are resolved through
the spirit of cooperation. After the negotiations and deliberations
are done, in the end, the family acts together. Underlying this view
of the household is the assumption that family members are able to
make binding agreements to enforce the joint allocation, and that
irreconcilable differences lead to divorce or household dissolution.6
In other words, without cooperation, there is no household.
While divorce may  be the ultimate threat in the context of
marital bargaining, there are reasons to expect that marital non-
cooperation is possible (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Divorce may
not always be socially acceptable, can entail prohibitive costs and
irreversible consequences, and therefore may  not be a credible
threat, particularly in the negotiation of ordinary household dis-
putes (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Bergstrom, 1996). A number
of researchers have instead used the noncooperative equilibrium
within the marriage, aptly described by Bergstrom (1996) as “harsh
words and burnt toast,” as the threat point within the Nash bar-
gaining framework (for example, see Lundberg and Pollak, 1993;
Carter and Katz, 1997; Chen and Wooley, 2001). In a noncoopera-
tive marriage, partners behave independently, pursuing their own
personal preferences subject to their own resource constraints, and
contributing voluntarily towards the provision of household public
goods. Noncooperative bargaining models therefore nest both the
cooperative and noncooperative solutions within the same frame-
work. If household members choose to cooperate, they pool all
their income and jointly allocate it, as in the cooperative solution.
Otherwise, the outcome is a noncooperative marriage given by the
Cournot–Nash equilibrium.7
Perhaps the most influential among the class of noncoopera-
tive bargaining models is the separate spheres model introduced
by Lundberg and Pollak (1993).  When cooperation breaks down
due to prohibitive transactions costs or low expected gains from
cooperation, the noncooperative separate spheres equilibrium is
6 Since marital bargaining can be interpreted as a repeated game, the enforce-
ability of the cooperative outcome can be justified using the folk theorem (Pollak,
2005).
7 More recently, researchers have moved towards accommodating more nonco-
operative behavior within households in other ways. For example, see Konrad and
Lommerud (2000), Lundberg and Pollak (2003), Aura (2005),  Mazzocco (2007), and
Fletschner (2009).
characterized by gender specialization in the division of household
responsibilities (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Thus, each spouse
makes independent decisions within his or her own sphere of influ-
ence, as defined by socially recognized and accepted gender roles.
An important contribution of this model is its explicit attention
to the role of traditional gender norms in coordinating behavior
within households even in the absence of explicit bargaining. This
result is widely corroborated in ethnographic research (Pahl, 1983,
1989, 1995; Benería and Roldán, 1987; Dwyer and Bruce, 1988), as
well as in the more recent survey conducted by Goldstein and Udry
(1999) in Ghana.
Although noncooperative bargaining models accommodate
both cooperative and noncooperative behavior, these outcomes
remain mutually exclusive. Therefore, it is unclear how the same
types of decisions can appear to be both jointly determined and
individually determined. The separate spheres equilibrium can
offer more guidance in explaining this phenomenon; what appears
to be cooperation may  in reality be a voluntary contribution equilib-
rium shaped by traditional social norms. But because these norms
are determined outside the model, further analysis of this outcome
within the separate spheres framework is limited.8
Alternatively, this paper presents a simplified model of intra-
household decision making where individuals noncooperatively
choose the optimal share of income they wish to devote towards
cooperation, where income is pooled and allocated collectively,
and towards noncooperation, where income is allocated indepen-
dently. This approach of modeling some decisions as cooperative
and some decisions as noncooperative is in line with more recent
semi-cooperative models proposed in the literature. For exam-
ple, in the conjugal contract model proposed by Carter and Katz
(1997), most decisions are assumed to be noncooperative except
for transfers between household members, which is the subject
of cooperative bargaining. Fletschner (2009) builds on Carter and
Katz’s (1997) conjugal contract model by specifying transfers of
credit between spouses as the subject of bargaining. Another exam-
ple is the model proposed by Konrad and Lommerud (2000),  where
they assume that human capital investments are chosen nonco-
operatively in the first period, while subsequent day-to-day time
allocation is chosen cooperatively. Similarly, Lundberg and Pollak
(2003) present a model where a couple’s initial location decision
is chosen noncooperatively, while subsequent decision making
proceeds collectively and efficiently. These last two models, in
particular, emphasize the inefficiencies that arise from the nonco-
operative decisions. The semi-cooperative model proposed in this
paper, on the other hand, emphasizes how spouses choose their
optimal degree of cooperation and its implications on information-
sharing within households.
The next section presents the model and derives its implications
using the example of joint saving as an area of cooperation within
the household.
3. Model
Consider a married couple, husband (h) and wife (w), who earn
exogenous incomes Yh > 0 and Yw > 0, respectively.9 The well-
being of the partners are linked through the joint consumption
of household public goods (e.g., a shared dwelling, household
8 See Elster (1989) and Sugden (1989) for a discussion of how norms are estab-
lished and maintained.
9 Note that this model is applicable to any two-person household. By assuming
that individuals earn exogenous incomes, it is implicitly assumed that wage rates
are given and that each individual spends a fixed number of hours in market work.
More generally, Yi can be interpreted as some fixed endowment, such as time, land,
and  other assets.
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sanitation, children’s well-being, precautionary savings, etc.). In
the absence of cooperation, each person can contribute voluntar-
ily towards the provision of household public goods. As Lundberg
and Pollak (1993) point out, the standard result is that these pub-
lic goods will be underprovided under a voluntary contribution
equilibrium.10
Alternatively, individuals can cooperate by contributing some
portion !i of their income, 0 ≤ !i ≤ 1, i = h, w, into a household pot
for the provision of household public goods. The proportion !i can
be interpreted as the degree to which the individual chooses to
cooperate with his or her spouse.11 Following the collective model,
assume that the couple allocates the pooled household income
jointly through some unspecified process, as if they were maxi-
mizing their weighted preferences where the weights or shares
represent their relative bargaining strengths (Chiappori, 1992,
1997; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). The resulting allocation
of the pooled household income will more closely reflect the pref-
erences of the more powerful spouse. This process is assumed to
yield the efficient level of household public goods. Thus, pooling
income and coordinating the individuals’ contributions in this way,
i.e., cooperation, yields potential gains relative to the voluntary
contribution or noncooperative equilibrium.
Formally, the outcome of cooperation is described as follows.
Let the (net) gains12 from cooperation be represented by the func-
tion G
 
!hYh, !wYw
 
≥ 0, such that G
 
0, !wYw
 
= G
 
!hYh, 0
 
= 0.
Thus, the case where only one person contributes to the household
public good is defined here as noncooperation. If some cooperation
does take place, !h > 0 and !w > 0, the couple splits the gains from
cooperation G(·) according to an exogenous sharing rule, 0 ≤ " ≤ 1,
which summarizes the extent to which each person’s preferences
are reflected in the allocation of pooled income. The sharing rule
can be interpreted as the reduced form of some unspecified process,
and is correlated with the relative bargaining strengths of individu-
als. This unspecified process could entail some form of bargaining or
negotiation, and may  also be determined by other external factors
like social norms and institutions. Assuming that " is the hus-
band’s share, the contributions !hYh and !wYw yield a payoff of
"G
 
!hYh, !wYw
 
for the husband, and (1  − ")G
 
!hYh, !wYw
 
for
the wife.
Any leftover income not pooled remains as discretionary income
of the individual, allocated independently without the need to coor-
dinate with one’s spouse. This discretionary income may  be used
for private consumption, private saving, or contributed towards any
other household public goods that the couple do not wish to jointly
provide. Let the total individual payoff be the weighted sum of
the benefits from cooperation and the benefits from the remaining
discretionary income:
H : #h = ıh"G(!hYh, !wYw) + (1 − ıh)(1 − !h)Yh, (1)
W : #w = ıw(1 − ")G(!hYh, !wYw) + (1 − ıw)(1 − !w)Yw. (2)
10 According to Lundberg and Pollak (1993, p. 993): “If individual family members
can supply public goods consumed by the entire household, then the noncooper-
ative family equilibrium is analogous to the voluntary provision of public goods
model analyzed by Bergstrom et al. (1986).  As one might expect, public goods are
undersupplied in this noncooperative equilibrium, and there are potential gains to
cooperation. Additional gains can be expected if coordination of individual contri-
butions is required for efficient household production. In the absence of cooperation
and coordination, the effective quantity of public goods and services such as meals
and child care will be less than the amounts that could be produced from the indi-
vidual contributions.”
11 !i may also embody the effort with which the fixed resource Yi is applied towards
a  cooperative activity.
12 More generally, the gains to cooperation function G(·) is net of any monitoring
or  transactions costs associated with the cooperation process. Note that the benefits
from cooperation represent utility gains from the consumption of a higher quantity
of  household public goods provided under cooperation.
where 0 ≤ !i ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ ıi ≤ 1, i = h, w.  The weights ıi represent the
preference of person i for the cooperation benefits relative to discre-
tionary income. Thus, in deciding how much to contribute towards
cooperation, individuals must weigh the benefits of increasing their
contribution to the household pool against the forgone benefit of
allocating that additional income independently.
Each person then chooses the contribution that maximizes his or
her total payoff. The first-order conditions represent reaction func-
tions, i.e., each person’s best response given the spouse’s actions.
The Cournot–Nash equilibrium is given by the intersection of the
two reaction functions.
This model is similar to a conventional noncooperative bargain-
ing model in many ways. Cooperation is possible and can yield
potential benefits. Under cooperation, income is pooled and jointly
allocated according to the bargaining strengths of individuals. Non-
cooperation is also possible, under which individuals can allocate
their income independently. In this model, restricting the contri-
butions such that !i = {0, 1} yields outcomes equivalent to those
obtained in a noncooperative bargaining model. Thus, the key dif-
ference between this model and the noncooperative bargaining
model is that !i can take on a range of values, 0 ≤ !i ≤ 1, and there-
fore the gains from cooperation may  also vary.
From this simple model, it is clear that the resulting income
pooling outcome depends largely on the characteristics of the
function G(·). The nature of the areas of cooperation within the
household as well as the social norms and institutions that gov-
ern the cooperation process will determine the degree to which
couples will pool their income and cooperate. In the next section,
this framework is applied to a situation where the couple can coop-
erate in saving for adverse shocks. The example of savings is chosen
specifically because partial savings pooling has been observed by
researchers in a number of specialized surveys (Anderson and
Baland, 2002; Ashraf, 2009).
3.1. Example: saving for a rainy day
Consider a couple in a low-income developing country context
where insurance and credit markets are imperfect. Thus, self-
insurance through precautionary savings is an important strategy
for dealing with unexpected adverse events (e.g., natural calami-
ties, accidents, theft, etc.). Any savings held by individuals that is
shared with the household when bad shocks occur can therefore
be viewed as a household public good. For simplicity, assume that
the interest rate is zero.
Suppose that saving for emergencies is the only area of cooper-
ation that can yield potential benefits to the couple.13 For example,
consider the possibility of a bad storm damaging the roof of the
house and causing it to leak. Since this unexpected event affects
the entire household, both individuals will be expected to make
a contribution towards fixing the roof. Setting aside a fund that
the couple could draw on for such emergencies therefore yields
potential benefits, relative to the situation where each would have
to reallocate their discretionary spending as the need arises. In this
context, it is reasonable to assume that increasing one person’s con-
tribution, holding the other spouse’s contribution constant, yields
positive but diminishing benefits. It is also reasonable to assume
decreasing returns to scale, e.g., doubling both individuals’ contri-
butions yields less than double the increase in benefits.
For couples, cooperation can also be a source of emotional con-
nection and an expression of caring. Individual contributions to
a joint savings fund may  be valued for the effort it embodies, in
13 Assume that all other household public goods are provided noncooperatively,
such that individuals specialize in the provision of those public goods that fall in
their traditional gendered sphere of influence (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993).
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addition to its material worth. Couples may  therefore enjoy bene-
fits from joint saving that go beyond the practical act of saving for
a rainy day. If indeed the willingness to contribute to joint savings
by one partner is taken to be an expression of caring and harmony,
then the other spouse may  be more willing to reciprocate and con-
tribute more as well, at the very least out of respect or a sense of
familial obligation (Badgett and Folbre, 1999).
The gains from cooperation can therefore be represented by the
Cobb–Douglas function:
G(!hYh, !wYw) = A(!hYh)˛(!wYw)ˇ (3)
where the benefits depend on the savings pooling contributions
!hYh and !wYw . The parameters A,  ˛ and  ˇ are positive constants
such that 0 < ˛,  ˇ < 1 and  ˛ +  ˇ < 1. Thus, the gains from coopera-
tion exhibits positive but diminishing returns to the contributions
of individuals and decreasing returns to scale. The parameters ˛
and  ˇ represent the benefit elasticities of the contributions of the
husband and wife, respectively. On the other hand, the parameter
A can represent other factors that could shift the net benefits from
joint saving. These factors can include, but need not be limited to,
the physical and social infrastructure that influence the frequency
and severity of adverse shocks, the availability and characteristics
of local financial institutions, as well as social norms that govern
how men  and women share financial information.
If some cooperation does take place, !h > 0 and !w > 0, the cou-
ple allocate the pooled savings jointly according to an exogenous
sharing rule, 0 ≤ " ≤ 1. The sharing rule summarizes the extent to
which each person’s preferences are reflected in how the savings
are used and therefore reflects the relative bargaining strengths of
individuals. For example, couples may  disagree on which shocks
take precedence. Should a larger share of the funds be spent on fix-
ing the roof, or in replacing a broken stove? In the extreme case
where " = 1 or " = 0, one spouse is able to dictate his or her prefer-
ences over how the pooled resources will be used and is therefore
able to capture all the benefits from cooperation. The spouse whose
preferences are ignored cannot enjoy the material and psychic ben-
efits from cooperation.
Assuming that " is the husband’s share, contributing !hYh
and !wYw to the pooled savings account yields payoffs of
"A
 
!hYh
 ˛ 
!wYw
 ˇ
and (1 − ")A
 
!hYh
 ˛ 
!wYw
 ˇ
for the husband
and wife, respectively. Substituting Eq. (3) into Eqs. (1) and (2)
yields the following total payoff functions:
H : #h = ıh"A(!hYh)˛(!wYw)ˇ + (1 − ıh)(1 − !h)Yh, (4)
W : #w = ıw(1 − ")A(!hYh)˛(!wYw)ˇ + (1 − ıw)(1 − !w)Yw. (5)
Each individual must then choose the contribution that yields
the highest total payoff subject to his or her budget constraint,
!i ≤ 1. The individual maximization problem is given by:
max
!i
#i s.t. !i ≤ 1, i = h, w. (6)
Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions are:14
H : !h =
1
Yh
✓
ıh
(1 − ıh)
˛"A(!wYw)ˇ
◆1/(1−˛)
, (7)
14 If the budget constraint binds for one partner, such that she contributes her full
income, the equilibrium outcome is obtained by substituting the maximum contri-
bution in the spouse’s reaction function. Note that full cooperation by one spouse
does not guarantee full cooperation by the other. In the trivial case where one per-
son’s optimal contribution is zero, no gains will be realized and therefore neither
spouse will contribute. This latter case yields the noncooperative outcome.
Fig. 1. Reaction functions.
W : !w = 1Yw
✓
ıw
(1 − ıw)ˇ(1 − ")A(!hYh)
˛
◆1/(1−ˇ)
. (8)
These first-order conditions are best response or reaction func-
tions, representing the optimal contribution !i for every possible
contribution of the spouse !j, i /= j. The Cournot–Nash equilibrium
is given by the intersection of these two  reaction functions, i.e.,
when both spouses choose mutual best responses. Fig. 1 shows the
individual reaction functions and the resulting equilibrium, point
E.
Solving for !h and !w simultaneously using Eqs. (7) and (8) yields
the following equilibrium contributions:
H : !∗h =
1
Yh
"
A
✓
ıh˛"
1 − ıh
◆1−ˇ✓
ıwˇ(1 − ")
1 − ıw
◆ˇ#1/(1−˛−ˇ)
, (9)
W : !∗w =
1
Yw
"
A
✓
ıwˇ(1 − ")
1 − ıw
◆1−˛✓
ıh˛"
1 − ıh
◆˛#1/(1−˛−ˇ)
. (10)
The solutions given by Eqs. (9) and (10) show that there are
four sets of factors that influence the shares of income spouses
will contribute to the joint savings account: own  income, relative
bargaining power ", the benefits from the cooperation process as
determined by the parameters ˛, ˇ, and A, and the preferences of
individuals given by the parameters ıh and ıw .
3.2. Comparative statics
From Eqs. (9) and (10), it is clear that the share of income that a
person will contribute to joint savings is inversely related to his or
her own  income and are independent of the spouse’s income. For
example, Fig. 2 shows the effect of an increase in the wife’s income.
The result is that the wife’s reaction function shifts to the left, so
that for every share chosen by her husband, she will contribute
a smaller share of her income to the savings pool. On the other
hand, the husband’s reaction function shifts up such that his con-
tribution will remain unchanged in equilibrium, while the wife’s
share will decrease to !∗∗w . This result is to be expected since the
benefits from cooperation depend on the absolute contributions.
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Fig. 2. Effect of an increase in Yw .
Formally, the comparative static effects of own income are given
by the following:
∂!∗h
∂Yh
= − 1
Y2h
"
A
✓
ıh˛"
1 − ıh
◆1−ˇ✓
ıwˇ(1 − ")
1 − ıw
◆ˇ#1/(1−˛−ˇ)
< 0, (11)
∂!∗w
∂Yw
= − 1
Y2w
"
A
✓
ıwˇ(1 − ")
1 − ıw
◆1−˛✓
ıh˛"
1 − ıh
◆˛#1/(1−˛−ˇ)
< 0. (12)
and the comparative static effects of the partner’s income is given
by ∂!∗h/∂Yw = ∂!∗w/∂Yh = 0.
The comparative static effect of relative bargaining power is
less straightforward. Looking at the reaction functions in Eqs. (7)
and (8),  it is clear that each person’s best response increases with
their own bargaining power. Therefore, an increase in " will shift
the husband’s reaction function outwards, and at the same time
shift the wife’s reaction function inwards. The net effect on the
equilibrium outcome will depend on which shift dominates. Tak-
ing the partial derivative of the equilibrium solutions !∗h and !
∗
w
with respect to " yields the following signs:
∂!∗h
∂"
! 0 if 1 − "
"
! ˇ
1 − ˇ ,
∂!∗w
∂"
! 0 if 1 − "
"
!1 − ˛
˛
.
Given  ˛ and ˇ, the comparative static effect of increasing the
relative bargaining power of the husband depends on the existing
balance of power. Increasing the bargaining power of one party is
more likely to encourage cooperation, i.e., both spouses contribute
more, if that party was initially disadvantaged. So moving from a
high degree of inequality towards more equality increases coopera-
tion, consistent with Pahl’s (1995) findings that egalitarian couples
are more likely to pool and jointly manage their money.15
15 Specifically, the more dominant the husband is (as " → 1), the more likely that
∂!∗
h
/∂" < 0 and ∂!∗w/∂" < 0. So both husband and wife will pool a lower share of
their income as the husband gains even more bargaining power, i.e., as "↑, and both
husband and wife will pool a higher share of their income as the wife gains more
bargaining power, i.e., as "↓. Conversely, the more dominant the wife is (as " → 0),
the more likely that ∂!∗
h
/∂" > 0 and ∂!∗w/∂" > 0. So when it is the wife who initially
has  the bargaining advantage, increasing the husband’s relative bargaining power
will result in both individuals contributing larger shares of their income towards
cooperation, and increasing the wife’s bargaining power even more will result in
both individuals contributing smaller shares of their income towards cooperation.
Suppose that the husband initially has the bargaining advantage
so that his preferences dominate how joint savings are allocated,
and that both spouses cooperate partially (0 < !i < 1). An increase
in the wife’s bargaining power will increase her share of the gains
from joint saving and therefore she will be willing to increase her
contribution. An increase in her contribution increases the hus-
band’s gains as well. So long as this increase in the husband’s gains
more than offsets his loss from the decline in his relative bargain-
ing power, he will reciprocate and contribute more. On the other
hand, any additional increases in the husband’s bargaining power
will further reduce the benefits from joint saving enjoyed by the
wife. She will then reduce her contribution, the overall gains from
joint saving contracts, reducing the benefits the husband enjoys,
and so he too will reduce his contribution.
But what happens if the existing balance of power is already
equal, i.e., " = 1/2? In this case, the comparative static effect of
moving away from equality depends solely on the benefit elasticity
of the other spouse’s contribution to joint savings. Therefore, the
change in the husband’s contribution depends on ˇ, and the change
in the wife’s contribution depends on ˛. This yields the following
signs:
∂!∗h
∂"
! 0 if 1
2
!ˇ,
∂!∗w
∂"
! 0 if ˛!1
2
.
Suppose that initially the spouses have equal bargaining power
(" = 1/2), and that both spouses cooperate partially (0 < !i < 1). An
increase in the husband’s bargaining power ("↑) will increase both
spouses’ contribution to joint savings if the husband’s benefit elas-
ticity is high (  ˛ > 1/2) and the wife’s benefit elasticity is low (  ˇ < 1/2).
This result is intuitive: the spouse whose contribution is more pro-
ductive, given by the high benefit elasticity, will be inclined to
contribute even more when his bargaining power is increased. An
increase in the husband’s contribution increases the wife’s gains
as well. So long as the increase in the wife’s gains more than off-
sets her loss from the decline in her bargaining power, she will
reciprocate and contribute more. On the other hand, if the bene-
fit elasticities are reversed so that the husband’s benefit elasticity
is low (˛ < 1/2) and the wife’s benefit elasticity is high (ˇ > 1/2),
increasing the husband’s relative bargaining power (i.e., decreasing
the wife’s bargaining power) will decrease both spouses’ contribu-
tions. In this case, the spouse whose contribution to joint savings is
more productive will be inclined to reduce her contribution when
her bargaining power is decreased. This in turn also reduces the
husband’s gains, and he will also decrease his contribution.16
Lastly, the comparative static effects of A can be easily deduced
from Eqs. (9) and (10). Factors that increase the overall benefits
from cooperation will encourage income pooling, increasing the
equilibrium contributions from both spouses. The effect of increas-
ing A is illustrated in Fig. 3, where both spouses increase their
equilibrium contributions to point E′ =
 
!∗∗w , !∗∗h
 
.
Formally, the comparative static effects of A are given by the
following:
∂!∗h
∂A
=
⇣
ch
1 −  ˛ − ˇ
⌘
A(˛+ˇ)/(1−˛−ˇ) > 0 (13)
16 In the case of precautionary savings, it is not clear that one spouse would have
an  advantage in producing more gains by contributing to the household pool. There
could be, however, other areas of cooperation where asymmetric benefit elasticities
are  plausible. For example, in countries where women grow subsistence crops and
men  grow cash crops, women’s contributions may  be more effective in ensuring
food security for the household because it is not tied to market fluctuations.
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Fig. 3. Effect of an increase in A.
∂!∗w
∂A
=
⇣
cw
1 −  ˛ − ˇ
⌘
A(˛+ˇ)/(1−˛−ˇ) > 0 (14)
where ch and cw are positive constants.
When both partners contribute their full income to joint sav-
ings, !∗w = !∗h = 1, the contributions become public information
and so no income can be hidden. Therefore, the hiding of income
can only occur under partial income pooling or nonpooling, i.e.,
0 ≤ !∗w, !∗h < 1. Because hidden income implies noncooperation,
the conditions that reduce contributions to joint savings, and
thus increase discretionary income, create opportunities for hiding
income. Nevertheless, noncooperation by itself does not provide an
incentive to hide financial information. To explore these incentives
further, another dimension of power is introduced in the model.
3.3. Limited autonomy
The model so far assumes that both individuals have the abil-
ity to choose how much of their income they wish to devote to
cooperation. This may  not always be the case, however; social and
gender norms could assign the right to choose the share of income
to be contributed by the couple to either the husband only or the
wife only. For example, many cultures assign men  as the traditional
head of the household, which could suggest that wives are com-
pelled to comply with what their husbands deem as the appropriate
contribution. This is akin to what Pahl (1983) refers to as control,
which is the decision making power over the type of allocative sys-
tem the household should adapt. Ethnographic evidence suggests
that the patriarchal regime is the norm among households in slum
areas in Kenya (Anderson and Baland, 2002), people from Upper
Egypt (Hoodfar, 1988), the Yoruba people in Nigeria (Fapohunda,
1988), and the Beti poeple in Cameroon (Guyer, 1988). On the other
hand, some cultures assign women as the traditional pursekeepers
or money managers of the household, as observed by researchers in
Indonesia (Papanek and Schwede, 1988), the Philippines (Aguilar,
1991; Ashraf, 2009), and Thailand (Nguanbanchong, 2004). This
norm may  confer to women the authority to demand what they
deem as the appropriate contribution from their husbands.
These cases can be accommodated in the model by restricting
the assumption of autonomy to apply only to one spouse and not the
other. Imposing this restriction therefore adds another dimension
of power in the model in addition to bargaining power.
3.3.1. Patriarchal regime
Suppose that the husband has the sole authority to choose the
income share to be contributed by both husband and wife to the
joint savings pool. Assume also that his choice is enforceable, i.e.,
his wife is compelled to contribute the appropriate amount he
demands. Therefore, the husband chooses the share that maximizes
his payoff, and then the wife follows the husband’s lead and con-
tributes the same proportion of her income. Using the previous
specification of the cooperation gains, the husband’s maximization
problem is given by:
max
!P
#h = ıh"A!˛+ˇP Y˛h Y
ˇ
w + (1 − ıh)(1 − !P)Yh, (15)
and the first-order condition is given by:
(˛ + ˇ)ıh"AY˛hYˇw
!1−˛−ˇP
= (1 − ıh)Yh. (16)
The optimal degree of cooperation under the patriarchal regime
is:
!∗P =

(  ˛ + ˇ)ıh"AYˇw
(1 − ıh)Y1−˛h
 1/(1−˛−ˇ)
, (17)
which is increasing in the wife’s income, decreasing in the hus-
band’s income, and increasing in the husband’s bargaining power.
3.3.2. Matriarchal regime
Conversely, suppose that the wife has the sole authority to
choose the income share to be contributed by both husband and
wife. Again, assume that her choice is enforceable, i.e., her husband
is compelled to contribute the appropriate amount she demands.
The wife’s maximization problem is therefore given by:
max
!M
#w = ıw(1 − ")A!˛+ˇM Y˛h Y
ˇ
w + (1 − ıw)(1 − !M)Yw, (18)
and the first-order condition is given by:
(  ˛ + ˇ)ıw(1 − ")AY˛hYˇw
!1−˛−ˇM
= (1 − ıw)Yw. (19)
The optimal degree of cooperation under the matriarchal regime
is:
!∗M =
✓
(  ˛ + ˇ)ıw(1 − ")AY˛h
(1 − ıw)Y1−ˇw
◆1/(1−˛−ˇ)
, (20)
which is increasing in the husband’s income, decreasing in the
wife’s income, and increasing in the wife’s bargaining power.
3.4. Discussion
In the household regimes described above, there are two partic-
ular results that differ from the case of individual autonomy. First,
the equilibrium degree of cooperation !∗P and !
∗
M depend on both
spouses’ incomes, whereas under individual autonomy only one’s
own  income mattered. An increase in income of the non-deciding
spouse would have reduced that spouse’s contribution under indi-
vidual autonomy. But under limited autonomy, the partner who
does decide will want to increase the degree of cooperation in the
household to be able to share the benefits from the higher income
from the non-deciding spouse.
Second, the comparative static effect of relative bargaining
power is no longer ambiguous. The degree of cooperation in the
household will be increasing in the deciding spouse’s bargaining
power. Thus, increasing women’s bargaining power within a patri-
archal regime will result in a lower share of income pooled by both
the husband and the wife. When the wife has more influence in how
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the joint savings account will be used, the cooperation benefits real-
ized by the husband is reduced. Consequently, he will decrease his
contribution and his wife follows suit.
Conversely, increasing women’s bargaining power within a
matriarchal regime will result in more income pooling for both
spouses. Increasing the wife’s bargaining power implies that she is
better able to influence the allocation of the joint resources towards
her preferences and is thus able to capture a larger share of the
cooperation gains. Under a matriarchal regime, the wife will then
choose to contribute a higher share of her income to the household
pool and demand the same higher share from her husband.
Given that men  tend to earn higher incomes on average com-
pared to women (Blau and Kahn, 2003; International Labour
Organisation, 2009), under which regime can one expect to observe
more income pooling? This model predicts that, the higher the
income gap between the husband and wife, the more likely that
the couple will pool more income under a matriarchal regime. This
result is intuitive. If the husband earns significantly more than the
wife, and the wife has the sole authority to choose the contribu-
tions, the wife will demand a larger contribution from the husband
to be able to share in the benefits of that income. Comparing the
two solutions yields the following condition:
!∗M > !
∗
P if
Yh
Yw
>
"ıh(1 − ıw)
(1 − ")(1 − ıh)ıw
. (21)
This result suggests that conventional household surveys that
implicitly assume full income pooling are more likely to miss more
information in populations where a patriarchal household regime
is the norm, compared to populations where a matriarchal regime
is more common. More generally, however, limited autonomy can
create incentives for the non-deciding partners to conceal income
from their spouses if they are compelled to contribute a higher
share than they would prefer if they had the choice.
Under a patriarchal regime, the wife has an incentive to hide
income if the contribution demanded by the husband, !∗P , is greater
than the optimal income share she would choose to contribute if
she could decide for herself, !∗w . Comparing the two solutions yields
the following condition:
!∗P > !
∗
w if
"
(1 − ") >
Yh
Yw
ˇıw(1 − ıh)
ıh(1 − ıw)
⇣
˛˛
 ˛ + ˇ
⌘1/(1−˛)
. (22)
So given a patriarchal regime, the wife is more likely to have an
incentive to hide income as the husband’s bargaining power rises,
and as her own income rises. Conversely, the wife is less likely to
hide income as her own bargaining power rises, and as her income
falls. This result is consistent with Anderson and Baland’s (2002)
observation that married women who participate and therefore
save secretly in ROSCAs have higher individual incomes on aver-
age compared with non-participants. They argue that the primary
reason women seek to hide their savings from their husbands is the
asymmetry of preferences, where women value household public
goods more than men. But conflicting preferences in itself would
not lead women to hide their income if they had enough bargain-
ing power in the household. Thus, the role of power, which comes
through very clearly in Anderson and Baland’s (2002) ethnographic
interviews, is made more explicit in this model, where the inter-
action of both autonomy and bargaining power could explain the
need of women to hide their savings. In the case where the hus-
band is completely dominant, i.e., " → 1 as in a unitary model, the
wife’s incentive to hide income will be very high. Therefore, collect-
ing data from the husband alone, even in the case of a dictatorship,
will potentially miss any financial information hidden by the wife.
Similarly, the husband under a matriarchal regime has an incen-
tive to hide income if the contribution demanded by the wife, !∗M ,
is greater than the optimal share he would choose to contribute if
he could decide for himself, !∗h. Comparing the two solutions yields
the following condition:
!∗M > !
∗
h if
(1 − ")
"
>
Yw
Yh
˛ıh(1 − ıw)
ıw(1 − ıh)
✓
ˇˇ
 ˛ + ˇ
◆1/(1−ˇ)
. (23)
So given a matriarchal regime, the husband is more likely to have
an incentive to hide income as the wife’s bargaining power rises,
and as his own income rises. It follows that the husband is less
likely to hide income as his own  bargaining power rises, and as his
own income falls. This result appears to be consistent with Ashraf’s
(2008) findings regarding the effect of a positive income shock on
saving behavior in the Philippines. She reports that among the men
whose wives make the savings decisions in the household (a matri-
archal regime), men  are more likely to save the windfall income into
their own  account when their wives will not be informed of their
decision, and are more likely to commit it to personal consump-
tion when their wives will be informed (Ashraf, 2009). She also
finds similar behavior among women whose husbands make the
household savings decisions (a patriarchal regime) (Ashraf, 2009).
As noted above, wives are more likely to have an incentive to hide
income as their own  income rises under a patriarchal regime.
The relative taste for cooperation (ıi) can also contribute to the
incentive to hide income. As might be expected, the non-deciding
spouse is more likely to hide income if the deciding spouse’s taste
for cooperation is stronger than their own. So under a matriarchal
regime, if the wife has a stronger preference for cooperation than
the husband (ıw > ıh), then the husband will be more likely to hide
income. Given these same preferences, there will be less incentive
for the wife to hide income under a patriarchal regime, since the
optimal contribution chosen by the husband is unlikely to exceed
his wife’s own desired contribution.
Note that the incentive to hide income can exist in both regimes
even when bargaining power is equal, " = 1/2. Equal power implies
that the preferences of both husband and wife are equally reflected
in the allocation of joint savings and so they also share equally in
the benefits from cooperation. Nevertheless, income asymmetries
could still create incentives for hiding income. A high-earning wife
in a patriarchal regime and a high-earning husband in a matriar-
chal regime may  not wish to contribute as much as their partner
demands, even with equal bargaining power. In both these cases,
there will be an incentive for the non-deciding spouse to hide
income.
All these results depend largely on the characteristics of the G(·)
function. In the example of precautionary savings adopted here,
the gains from cooperation is specified as a Cobb–Douglas function.
However, applying this model to a different context of cooperation
that exhibits different characteristics in terms of returns to scale,
marginal benefits and marginal cross-benefits is likely to yield a dif-
ferent set of results. Thus, how researchers conceptualize the areas
of cooperation within the household is crucial in predicting the
income pooling behavior of couples. To further guide economists
in unraveling the black box of intrahousehold behavior, more qual-
itative and quantitative information should be collected regarding
the process of cooperation within households.
4. Conclusions
The model developed in this paper combines features of
noncooperative bargaining models (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993;
Carter and Katz, 1997; Konrad and Lommerud, 2000; Chen and
Wooley, 2001) and collective models (Chiappori, 1988, 1992,
1997; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003) to demonstrate the semi-
cooperative character of household financial decision making.
Noncooperative bargaining models use the noncooperative equi-
librium as the threat point in a cooperative bargaining game. The
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outcome is either cooperation, if the utility gains from cooperation
are sufficient, or noncooperation, if the threat points offer more
utility. In contrast, the model introduced here recognizes that coop-
erative and noncooperative behavior within households need not
be mutually exclusive. The key innovation of this approach is to
characterize individuals’ decision to cooperate as a continuous vari-
able, defined by the share of income they choose to contribute to
the household pool.
Applied to the example of saving as an area of household coop-
eration, this model predicts that the equilibrium contributions to
the joint savings account is decreasing in own income and increas-
ing in other factors that can shift the overall benefits of saving
jointly. These factors can include physical and social infrastruc-
ture, the characteristics of local financial institutions, as well as
social norms that govern how men  and women share financial
information. However, the relationship between the joint savings
contributions and relative bargaining power depend on the initial
balance of power. In particular, increasing the bargaining power of
one partner is more likely to result in higher savings pooling only
if that person was initially disadvantaged. This is also consistent
with Pahl’s (1995) findings that egalitarian couples are more likely
to pool and jointly manage their money.
In addition to the concept of bargaining power within a coop-
erative setting, another dimension of power can be imposed on
the model by restricting individual autonomy to apply to only
one spouse. Limited autonomy can create incentives for the non-
deciding partners to conceal income from their spouses if they are
compelled to contribute a higher share than they would prefer if
they had the choice. When the husband has the authority to decide
on both spouses’ joint saving contributions, the wife is more likely
to have an incentive to hide income as the husband’s bargaining
power rises, and as her own income rises. Conversely, when it is the
wife who holds that authority, the husband is more likely to have
an incentive to hide income as the wife’s bargaining power rises,
and as his own income rises. These observations appear to be con-
sistent with the findings of Ashraf (2009) in the Philippines, where
a positive income shock is more likely to be hidden by husbands in
matriarchal regimes and by wives in patriarchal regimes.
Also, the larger the gap between male and female incomes, the
more likely that a matriarchal regime will exhibit a higher degree of
savings pooling relative to a patriarchal regime. Since women  con-
tinue to earn lower incomes on average compared with men  (Blau
and Kahn, 2003; International Labour Organisation, 2009), this
result suggests that conventional household surveys that implicitly
assume full income pooling are more likely to miss more informa-
tion in populations where a patriarchal household regime is the
norm, compared to populations where a matriarchal regime is more
common.
This model reinforces the issues raised by noncooperative
household models on traditional survey methodology, thus pro-
viding further theoretical support for the call to collect survey data
from individuals rather than household representatives. If individ-
uals deliberately conceal income from their spouse to avoid pooling
that income, then the private information missed by traditional
surveys will be nonrandom and may  significantly bias empirical
analyses that use household income as a regressor (Ashraf, 2009).
Furthermore, if the contributions to the household pool depend on
bargaining power, as this model suggests, then this could result in
significant collinearity between the proxy measures of bargaining
power and pooled household income. Both issues can be addressed
by collecting financial data from individuals in separate interviews,
which better captures any private information withheld by the
individual from the rest of the household.
Although this model’s assumptions are plausible, as corrobo-
rated by the interdisciplinary evidence on this subject, whether the
optimal conditions implied by the model actually hold in reality
is an empirical question that merits further study. To answer this
question, more detailed information on decision making processes,
the nature of cooperation, and information sharing practices within
the household must be collected in addition to individual financial
information.
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